

**TOP SECRET**

[Redacted]

25 September 1963

Copy 8 of 12

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**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Executive Director, NPIC

**SUBJECT :** NPIC's Role in Field Readouts

1. Pursuant to your request, attached is a short staff study regarding a proposed NPIC role in the Far East. The study is purposely short, as much has been written and discussed previously on this subject. Pertinent prior written material is enclosed as attachments.

2. Copies of the study are out for coordination to all divisions and staffs of NPIC and to CIA/PID (NPIC). Because of current operations directly related to this proposal, I have requested comments on this proposal to be directed to you by COB, Friday, ~~27 Sep. 63~~ **2 Oct. 63**

[Redacted]

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Assistant for Photographic Analysis, NPIC

**Enclosures:** 8

25X1D

**Attachment A:** [Redacted]

- B:** Draft SOP, Overseas  
AQUATONE Ops. [Redacted]  
(Pg. 1)
- C:** Proposed for Trial NPIC  
Element, FE PAG/M 67-63 **SECRET**
- D:** Proposal for Estblmt. of a  
FE Joint Photo Interp. Ctr.  
PAD 48/62 **SECRET**
- E:** Excerpts from FE Trip Rpt.  
[Redacted]
- F:** Proposal for FE Joint Photo  
Interp. Ctr. -- P&DS Study  
79 Oct. 62 **SECRET**
- G:** Excerpt from FE Trip Rpt.  
[Redacted]
- H:** Proposal for Estblmt. of Emer.  
Situation Team -- [Redacted]

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USAF review(s) completed.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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Cops 8 of 12

25 September 1969

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PROBLEM:

To gain acceptance of NPIC's responsibility for field readout of overflights accomplished against national priority requirements (COMOR).

Facts Bearing on the Problem:

1. There are 15 Far East missions scheduled in the next 45 days. An undetermined number of these are to be readout in the field.
- A X 2. NSCID #8 assigns the immediate reporting mission to the National Photographic Interpretation Center.
- X 3. PI readouts on national priority requirements (COMOR) are the assigned function of the NPIC PAG component.

Discussion

B - 1. As stated in Attachment A, the reasons for initiating overseas readouts, e.g., the rapid dissemination of information of direct interest to field commands and headquarters, are still valid. The responsibility for choosing the immediate readout location as stated in this letter apparently rests with COMOR (Formerly AD HOC Requirements Committee). The responsibility for PI readout, based on the NSCID #8 rests with the National Photographic Interpretation Center, a composite of CIA and DIA photographic interpreters operationally under the control of the Director, NPIC.

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C - 2. Attachment B is a portion of the original SOP for [redacted] established before the creation of NPIC. It designates the organizations responsible for providing the Commander and D/Commander of the [redacted]. In cognizance of the establishment of DIA, the Commander's role has been somewhat altered. No cognizance has been taken of the establishment of PAG (NPIC) as regards the selection of a D/Commander.

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3. Attachments C through H set forth proposed concepts for the strengthening of the overseas [redacted] NPIC role in the field of photographic exploitation. Community acceptance of any portion of this concept requires that NPIC take at least the initial step of providing PI field readouts to validate its authority under NSCID #8.

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*Some do not bear on problem above*


D - 4. Past policy on where immediate readouts are to be located has been somewhat erratic in that one mission may be designated for an [redacted] readout and a following mission designated for NPIC readout. This breaks the continuity of PI reporting and can result in one contingent providing immediate readout on a mission residing temporarily at another facility.

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By [redacted]

Recommendations:

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1. With the concurrence of the DOD, NPIC's (contingency) overseas role in immediate reporting be established and implemented with the dispatch of a [redacted] team of interpreters to [redacted] for the present 45 day schedule.

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2. That the D/Commander designate in paragraph II E. of the "draft" SOP March 57 am read to read "NPIC" instead of "CIA".

3. That all missions accomplished in the Far East, wherein possible be readout at the field facility, to provide expeditious dissemination of intelligence to field commands and headquarters and for continuity of reporting.

4. That in conjunction with the Defense Intelligence Agency planning steps be initiated for the establishment of a permanent Far East adjunct to NPIC embodying the principle objectives set forth in Attachments C through E.

Consideration

GRC 176 cable readout received  
NPIC Fri. Sept. 27 — Neg. due  
in Oct. 1-2 on way to EK  
for titling + DP processing.  
What has been saved over sending  
film directly back to EK for  
processing + board selection +  
readout at NPIC?

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ATTACHMENT A

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Headquarters United States Air Force  
Washington 25, D. C.

Copy 8 of 12  
(TH 1616-7)

Page 1

20 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

25X1D SUBJECT: (Uncl) [ ]

25X1D 1. In accordance with the understanding reached at the 13 March meeting of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee a draft SOP for a [ ] is herewith submitted.

25X1D 2. It is our view that advantage should be taken of the experience in Europe which resulted in the establishment of [ ] on a "crash" basis. Although the need for reporting of indications type intelligence from Far East Aquatone missions is not as urgent at the moment as the need in the Middle East was at the time the [ ] were established in Europe, it is felt that the facility should be available and procedures agreed upon in order to insure immediate use in the event the need arises. 25X1D

3. Far Eastern Aquatone operations conducted [ ] will, in practically every case, result in material of direct and immediate interest to the Theater Commanders. To take the time to transport all the material to Rochester for processing and on to Washington for exploitation would result in an unnecessary delay of weeks and possibly months in getting this intelligence back to them. Leaving a duplicate positive film in the Theater would also provide insurance against possible loss or damage that might be incurred in transit. This consideration is of greater significance in the Far East as compared to Europe in view of the transportation distances involved. 25X1A

JAMES H. MACIA, JR.  
Colonel, USAF  
Directorate of Intelligence

1 Incl  
Draft SOP

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Attachment B



Copy 8 of 12  
DRAFT - page 1

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**SUBJECT:** Policy and Procedures for Overseas Handling, Processing and Reporting on Photographic Results of AQUATONE Operations

I. **PURPOSE:** To define responsibilities for overseas handling, processing and reporting on photographic results of Far East AQUATONE operations and to establish policies and procedures pertaining thereto.

II. **DEFINITIONS:**

A. **DETACHMENT C:** The AQUATONE Operational or Project Unit stationed [redacted]

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B. **DETACHMENT COMMANDER:** The individual designated by AQUATONE Project Headquarters as the Commander of an AQUATONE field unit or detachment.

C. [redacted] established 25X1D by Headquarters FEAF [redacted] which 25X1D processes and exploits Far East Area AQUATONE products for preliminary photographic interpretation to insure expeditious reporting to Washington and to meet theater needs. Participation in the center is open to representatives of CIA, Army and Navy.

25X1D D. [redacted] An Air Force officer designated by FEAF to command the center [redacted] 25X1D

25X1D E. [redacted] A CIA representative designated to serve as Deputy to the Commander, [redacted] for technical 25X1D and substantive intelligence matters only.



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Attachment C  
PAG/M-67-63  
26 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

THROUGH: Executive Director, NPIC

SUBJECT: Proposal for Trial NPIC Element, Far East

1. Events of National significance are occurring with increased frequency throughout the Far East area. Increased awareness on the part of US policy makers has culminated in approving photo collections far in excess of any previous efforts. The exploitation of this material and the responsibility for dissemination rests with the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). That this responsibility rests within NPIC is not only embodied within the NSCID #8, but is reaffirmed by DIA response as regards support to exploitation by DIA and CIA personnel of PAG/NPIC in the Far East and the concept envisioned by the CO [redacted] 25X1D


Several weeks ago, however, a mission flown against National requirements was exploited in the field with no participation by NPIC PIs. I would assert that this is an abdication of NPIC's responsibility. *??*

25X1A 2. Other recent developments in the Far East area are concerned with establishment of [redacted] and [redacted] for the purposes of not only supporting conventional military operations but also for support to clandestine activity of a paramilitary nature, presently the responsibility of CIA/DDP. Further there is a growing awareness in the National Intelligence Community of photo collection programs which produce information of National significance, but the material receipt of which at NPIC, is either sporadic or nonexistent. It is also apparent from a number of persons who have visited the area that awareness of available coverage and its intelligence potential for exploitation are not well understood by many key personnel in the field having command responsibilities for implementing US policy. *PI's + CIA-PI did partic.* 25X1A

3. I would, therefore, recommend that your consideration be given to a proposal that planning be commenced toward the establishment on a trial basis of 3 months a small NPIC element in the Far East that would be the model for other elements in other areas of the world as the need arises. This element would initially consist of a senior CIA and DIA officer, a collateral support man and 2 DIA and 2 CIA photo analysts. The unit would be located [redacted] and would perform the following functions: *7* 25X6

a. Provide immediate readout of missions accomplished against COMOR requirements and present post-mission briefings to responsible field commands in the Far East area.

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SUBJECT: Proposal for Tra~~4~~1 NPIC Element, Far East

C b. Provide a rapid deployment capability throughout the Far East area against critical requirements for PI exploitation utilizing all-source photography and provide guidance and support on photographic matters [redacted] (There was considerable requirement for this [redacted] tenure there and limited services were provided by the 67th RTS).

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H c. Perform 2nd phase reporting in all non-system photography wherein items of National significance are noted.

8 d. Devise and maintain a centralized system for levying collection requirements on non-system area assets, both aerial and ground, and provide a systematic expeditious dissemination of these and other collections to Headquarters, NPIC through [redacted]

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e. Acquaint area commands with NPIC operations, products and needs, and elicit for NPIC knowledge of operations products, and needs of the various field commands.

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g. Establish a current collateral support backup capability and provide for maintenance on a continuous basis.

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[redacted]  
Deputy Assistant for Photographic Analysis, NPIC

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PAD 48/62  
24 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, NPIC

THRU: Executive Director, NPIC

FROM: Chief, CIA/PAD (NPIC)

SUBJECT: Proposal for Establishment of a Far East Joint Photographic Interpretation Center

I. Proposal


Establish a Joint Photographic Interpretation Center in the Far East as an adjunct of the National Photographic Interpretation Center to provide for rapid, coordinated photographic intelligence service in support of all theater commands and in response to directed national policies.

II. Facts for Discussion

- A. Authority for establishment of proposed center granted under NSCID #8.
- B. The various photo collection programs with their different security classifications, processing and exploitation centers make estimates and indications intelligence nearly impossible.
- C. Present procedures fail to provide centralized inputs for photo reconnaissance collection efforts.
- D. The services have not provided effective and efficient photo interpretation support to the theater commands in view of the duplication of effort that currently exists in terms of requirements handling, targeting and interpretation.
- E. Detachments from the proposed center can be deployed to service the quasi-tactical requirements of the local commands.

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*Prepared by [redacted] his trip [redacted] submitted for [redacted] govt to [redacted] 1st phase*

*following discussion only*



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Approved For Release 2003/10/08 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100080024-9

Approved For Release 2003/10/08 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100080024-9

ATTACHMENT F

9 October 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Executive Director, NPIC

**SUBJECT :** Staff Coordination; Proposal for Far East  
Joint Photographic Interpretation Center

1. In conducting the subject staff study no coordination and a minimum of contact was made with the staffs and components of NPIC because of the nature of the subject.

2. However, the recommendations we make here reflect expressions of opinion of several NPIC personnel that are supported by our own observations and analysis of available information on the subject matter.

  
Chief,  
Technical Plans and Development Staff

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

1. The Plans Staff is recommending that NPIC take the initiative in proposing the establishment of a joint photographic interpretation center in the Far East. NPIC, sooner or later, must take a stand on this issue, no matter from what quarters such a proposal originates. Lagging could mean that NPIC give up a function by default. Such a proposal from us will help jell the opinions of the intelligence community and give early action to a much needed activity in the Far East.

2. Some time ago, you requested the Staff to come up with a clear-cut policy delineating between tactical and strategic reconnaissance, and the part that NPIC should play. We believe that the handling of CHURCHDOOR material and the proposal to send out PI's to the Far East (IG Report) already show that all photography can contribute to National Requirements. Conversely, we believe that NPIC's reconnaissance sources can contribute photo data to limited war or tactical warning capabilities of the Theatre Commander. To delineate photography into the so called tactical and strategic as a basis for action is to unnecessarily fragment an activity that requires a unity approach to its exploitation problems.

3. Our proposal for the joint center in the Far East is such an approach to the exploitation problem that now begs for a solution. If established, it would become the model for other Centers to follow if the world situation dictates.

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**PROBLEM:** To determine if NPIC should initiate steps to establish a joint photographic interpretation center in the Far East as an adjunct to the parent organization.

**FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:**

1. The Far East has become a critical area, and requires a joint photographic interpretation center to centralize collection requirements handling, and to provide rapid, coordinated photo intelligence service to support the various theatre commands.
2. At present, each Service conducts various collection programs and, in the main, exploits photography for its own needs. The CIA and the ~~classification~~ intelligence services are involved also. These various exploitation efforts have resulted in a conglomerate of procedures, programs, and personnel leading to duplication of effort, wasted motion, and piecemeal handling of a common problem.
3. Central records are required to backstop questions affecting U.S. policy or U.S. security. No central equipment and personnel records are kept in the photo exploitation field, yet equipment, techniques, etc. are turned over to other countries and foreign FI personnel are utilized.
4. To fulfill its mission, NPIC requires the coverage of all pertinent photography, including the so-called "tactical." A projection of NPIC efforts in the field is needed.
5. Two statements of NSCID #8 bear on our problem: (a) The purpose of NSCID #8 is to ensure "the most effective, timely and economic exploitation of photography as a source for intelligence relating to national security." (b) "Certain photographic intelligence

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functions can be best performed as a central service of common concerns, for the maximum benefit of the entire intelligence community.

DISCUSSION

1. A joint exploitation center in the Far East will minimize the duplication of effort that now exists in the Services' exploitation centers and will centralize requirement handling, targetting, and interpretation. Users of photography in the field should have a uniform product from a joint readout center, and not be required to determine accuracy of targets from several target lists.

2. NPIC must take the initiative in proposing the establishment of a joint photographic interpretation center in the Far East operating as an adjunct to it. Failure to do this will invite other efforts to accomplish the same end with less know-how, more delay, and in piecemeal fashion. We cannot give up a logical function by default. In other information exploitation fields, the Services have procedures established to form joint activities if required:

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3. A joint center established by NPIC in the Far East will benefit from NPIC's experience, facilities and know-how. NPIC's established mechanism can marshal the best in equipment, collateral material, and personnel for the benefit of the field intelligence community. We should not settle for less than this "package" approach.

4. An adjunct of NPIC in the Far East will assist its parent organization in carrying out its mission. The so-called tactical photography


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can contribute to fulfilling National Requirements. The recommendation of CIA's Inspector General to send NPIC's PI's to the various field exploitations merely recognizes the need for coverage, but at the same time is only a piecemeal attempt at solving a pressing problem. The situation in the Far East at the present time is not conducive to carrying out NPIC's mission.

5. A joint center is required to maintain Central Records that will backstop questions affecting the policy and security of the United

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The establishment of a joint photographic interpretation center in the Far East is needed to provide effective and efficient support of photo exploitation, and the coordination of photo recon requirements for the Theatre Commander now, and will be in-being in time of war.

2. NPIC requires a joint exploitation center in the Far East to effectively carry out its mission as specified in NSCID #8.

3. Vital records affecting the security of the United States

be centrally maintained for the coordinated use of the Services and the CIA.

4. NPIC, pre-eminent in its field, unprohibited by authority, must take the initiative in establishing the joint photographic interpretation center.

RECOMMENDATION

NPIC initiate a proposal to DIA and the CIA to send a joint survey team to the Far East on a fact gathering mission for the purpose of establishing a joint photographic interpretation center, as an adjunct to NPIC; that upon return, the survey team will make appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for effective directives for its implementation.

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Approved For Release 2003/10/08 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100080024-9

Approved For Release 2003/10/08 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100080024-9



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ATTACHMENT II

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PIC/GID/68/54  
18 August 1959  
Copy 8 of 12  
Series A

Proposal for Establishment of Emergency Situation Team

Prompted by the current problem of photo lab shortcomings at OXY centers and the willingness of the Air Force to continue their support of the TALENT program but to turn over processing responsibility to the Agency it is hereby proposed that the Agency establish an Emergency Situation Team.

An Emergency Situation Team shall consist of approximately 5-7 individuals from PIC including 1 photo lab technician and 4-6 PI officers. These PI officers would be called upon to assist in the operation of the photo lab as well as to interpret photography and all other associated duties. This concept, of course, calls for well trained, experienced and willing individuals who can work together as a team under trying conditions and varying pressures. Based upon previous experiences in the field it is felt that a small, compact team could form the nucleus of OXY centers which could serve the needs of the intelligence community more efficiently and quickly.

Each member of the team, except the photo lab technician, would be required to assist in all phases of the operation to include final report writing, photo interpretation, film handling and processing, maintenance and operation of photo lab equipment and facilities, loading and unloading equipment and materials, and lesser duties associated with the OXY operation. To insure efficiency it would be best for all members of this team to be thoroughly familiar with all phases of OXY operations. This would require a short familiarization period of photo lab techniques.

One important part of the team concept is to be constantly ready and mobile. Each team member should be up to date on immunization records, pass ports, personal affairs, and etc. In view of past inadequacies in obtaining up-to-date support type materials such as maps, keys, collateral and PI equipment in the field such items could be assembled and made ready to ship concurrently with the team. This team should be as nearly self sustaining as possible.

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[REDACTED]

10 August 1959

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The advantages of establishing an Emergency Situation Team lie in the mobility, efficiency, willingness and dedication to the TALENT program of a compact team such as outlined above. In addition, if properly executed, such a concept should enhance the prestige of PIC and CIA in the eyes of other program participants.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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